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Intervenors, Thomas Samuel Steed, Don Ronald Fischer, Dean Joseph Barlow, 
Richard Gilbert, Brent Jeffs, Walter Scott Fischer and Richard Jessop Ream, submit 
this Reply Brief On Certified Question from the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit. 
I. REPLY 
The FLDS are clearly troubled by the fact that this Court wrote a detailed written 
opinion in response to their petition for extraordinary relief In their Opening Brief, the 
FLDS argue that "where the court gives a written explanation of the reasons for 
dismissing a petition for extraordinary writ, the preclusive effect of the dismissal 
depends on [1] the express terms of the writing as well as [2] the nature of the case and 
[3] the circumstances of the denial." Opening Brief of Appellee at 2-3. Intervenors 
will accept this proposed analysis for purposes of their Reply Brief, while noting that 
it requires a case by case review. Because the certified question arose in the context 
of Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ ofLatter-Day Saints v. Lindberg, 2010 UT 
51, 238 P.3d 1054, that specific case will be reviewed and analyzed here. 
For the reasons set forth below, this Reply Brief will conclude that under the 
analysis suggested by the FLDS, detailed written decisions denying discretionary 
petitions for extraordinary writ based on laches—in the manner in which this Court 
decided Lindberg—are on the merits for purposes of claim preclusion. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
A. The Express terms of the Writing. 
The FLDS attempt to downplay this Court's written opinion in Lindberg: "The 
principle that a minute entry denial is presumptively not a decision of the merits, 
however, does not establish the converse position that a denial in a written opinion is 
presumptively on the merits " Id. at 13-4. No authority is cited for this conclusion. 
If a detailed written opinion is not—at least—presumptive of a decision on the merits, 
it is certainly a good indication that the court meant what it said. 
The Lindberg opinion is lengthy and detailed and must be read as a whole. 
Despite the express dispositive nature and holding of the opinion, the FLDS focus on 
one sentence in which this Court states it did not need to reach the constitutional 
assertions, to argue that the opinion is meaningless. In so doing, they ignore the well 
settled law of Utah that courts should resolve cases on the narrowest applicable 
grounds and avoid deciding constitutional issues whenever possible. See Intervenors5 
Brief on Certified Question from the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit, at 5-6 (referencing and discussing examples of the cases). 
Read in totality, the decision in Lindberg affirmatively appears to be on the 
merits. Concerned that this will be confirmed, the FLDS argue, despite the certified 
question before this Court, that "[i]t is for the Tenth Circuit to determine the preclusive 
effect (if any) of Lindberg within the federal court system. . . ." Opening Brief of 
Appellee, at 7. They ask, "does it affirmatively appear that the denial was intended to Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law L brary, J. Reuben Clark Law Sc ool, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
be on the merits, or is that the only possible conclusion given the grounds for denial?" 
Id. at 15. Then, rather than answer the question, they argue that this Court's precedents 
"should be applied in [the Tenth Circuit], not this Court, to ascertain the preclusive 
effect ofLindberg. . . ." Id. 
What is readily apparent are three things. First, despite the sentence relied on 
by the FLDS, read as a whole, Lindb erg was decided on the merits and should be 
confirmed by this Court as having preclusive effect. Second, the FLDS do not want 
this Court analyzing or addressing the express terms of its decision in Lindberg because 
this Court, better than any other court, knows of its extensive review of the voluminous 
file, its careful analysis of the facts and claims, and its intention to have its written 
opinion afforded preclusive effect. Third, notwithstanding the FLDS's argument, the 
Tenth Circuit has made it clear that the issue of laches is likely dispositive of this 
appeal, and that, as to the certified question, this Court has the final word. 
Thus, on the first point raised by the FLDS, when a petition for extraordinary 
writ is decided, the express terms of the denial, or as in Lindberg, the express terms of 
the detailed written opinion must be read as a whole and given the preclusive effect 
intended by the court. 
B. The Nature of the Case. 
For the reason addressed below, the FLDS brief ignores the underlying nature 
of this case and the extensive procedural facts that played out over many years before Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law Sch ol, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the district court. Thus, they seek to avoid having to address the troubled procedural 
history for which they solely are responsible. Having ignored their wilful failure to 
engage in the district court proceedings, the FLDS, in stead, hasten to criticize this 
Court's methodology and decision in Lindberg. 
Despite the fact that the FLDS sat on their rights for years and then elected to 
petition for extraordinary relief after all appeal deadlines had long passed, they argue 
that "because this court is not a fact finding court its rejection of an extraordinary writ 
cannot resolve the underlying merits except in unusual circumstances" Id. at 11 
(emphasis added, capitalization omitted). To the extent, that argument is not rejected 
out of hand, this Court should simply note that Lindberg involved "unusual 
circumstances," including the receipt and review of new evidence. 
The criticism that "[i]t is not the function of the appellate court to try the facts 
or substitute for the trial court in the determination of factual issues" is without merit 
under these unusual circumstances. Id. The need to decide the FLDS's petition for 
extraordinary writ was necessitated by the very history which gave rise to this Court's 
eventual decision on laches. That this Court did not exercise its discretion to dismiss 
the petition in one sentence but instead, went on to analyze the underlying procedural 
history, factual record, receive and review new evidence, review lengthy briefs, hear 
enlarged oral argument and then write a lengthy opinion clearly signaled that it wanted 
to resolve the matter with finality. Digitized by the How rd W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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The FLDS brief continues "[i]f another court has not created a proper evidentiary ( 
record, factual issues must be litigated before the appellate court." Id. at 12. Given the 
unusual circumstances giving rise to the FLDS's petition, this unusual step was, in fact,
 { 
taken. The Court considered all new evidence submitted by the FLDS, including 
testimony in the form of declarations.1 Under the circumstances, the petition was given 
every possible consideration before the Court reached its decision. To the extent the 
FLDS are unhappy, they must recognize that a laches defense necessarily arises when 
i 
one party's conduct prevents all of the parties from litigating normally. 
When a laches decision is on the merits, as here, the losing party loses the right 
to later assert that the case was somehow not fully and fairly litigated. In sum, the 
FLDS claim that "[h]ere preclusion would be based on facts that were never litigated," 
is only true to the extent they prevented it. Id. at 12. < 
C. The Circumstances of the Denial. 
The FLDS argue: "A finding of laches depends upon facts: the reasons for the < 
delay, the surrounding circumstances, and the consequences of the delay to the various 
!The Court declined to receive evidence submitted by the Intervenors which i 
sheds a very bright light on why the FLDS refused to engage in the Intervenors' 
underlying tort and racketeering lawsuits or in the subsequent probate action. Rather 
than allow the Court to be fully informed on this point, the FLDS successfully moved 
to strike that evidence. "Because of our resolution in this case, we find it unnecessary 
to rule.. . ." Lindberg, 2010 UT 5 1 4 22 n. 8. The FLDS do not complain about this 
result. This important evidence, however, was subsequently placed in the record in 
the collateral federal district court case, is part of the record on appeal to the Tenth 
Circuit, and is therefore now available in the record before this Court. 
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stakeholders in the litigation." Id. at 16. This Court addressed each of these factors in 
its opinion. At oral argument, the Court specifically asked counsel for the FLDS why 
the FLDS waited so many years before challenging the Trust's reformation. Counsel 
did not dispute the delay, responding that "the answer to that question lies inside the 
religious box" and relates to "a test of faith." App. at 4106,4127-28. Counsel did not, 
however, acknowledge what the religious test was, and, as mentioned, objected to this 
Court's review of the evidence. The Court, however, was already aware of the Trust's 
role in child abuse and rape from the extensive record and the district court's rulings. 
The test of faith concerning what was in the "religious box," of course, was 
whether, in light of the FLDS command to marry more girls at a younger age, the 
people would give up Warren Jeffs to protect their property: "The Lord will have me 
do this, get more young girls married, not only as a test to the parents, but also to test 
this people to see if they will give the Prophet up." App. at 3151. The consequence 
of this religious choice was also clear: "But brethren, this will bring the government 
down upon us quickly. Even put the United Effort Plan Trust lands under government 
control " App. at 3155-56. The FLDS passed this religious test knowing full well 
the consequences. 
In short, the many years of deliberately answering the courts nothing were the 
result of a religious choice. Years later, the FLDS should not be heard to be asking any 
court to undo that choice. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
I 
It was this religious test and what was in the "religious box55—child abuse and 
rape—that put counsel' s constitutional arguments in Lindberg in the proper context and 
helped inform this Court's decision on the FLDS's constitutional claims. It declined 
to reach those claims in its written decision even though counsel had argued that this 
Court's commitment to the Constitution should be strong enough to stay outside the 
religious box even if it did not agree with what was happening inside. App. at 4106, 
4127-28, 4154. By electing not to reach those claims in its opinion, this Court flatly 
rejected counsel's argument, and it did so on the merits of laches. 
There was no need for the Court to further balance the facts or address whether 
the First Amendment provides immunity for child abuse, rape and other illegal activity. 
By resolving the case on laches, this Court made it abundantly clear that it fully 
understood the facts and claims, and based on the same, concluded that it would not 
return the Trust to the very individuals responsible for using it for illegal practices and 
child abuses. 
II. CONCLUSION 
For these additional reasons, Intervenors respectfully request that the certified 
question be answered in a manner that makes it clear Lindberg was decided on the 
merits and should have preclusive effect. 
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